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Market Report Year 
Ago 
4 Wks 
Ago 12/6/14 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average       
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  . 131.48 168.00 172.38 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . . 189.26 281.60 294.54 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. . 163.55 237.73  256.64 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202.65 250.35 255.44 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 77.56 86.53 84.47 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89.37 95.41 92.23 
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr.,  Heavy, 
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . . 162.38 163.00 149.01 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359.11 377.03 387.78 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.57 5.01 5.86 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 4.16 3.20 3.57 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 12.98 9.55 9.81 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.32 6.39 6.82 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.73 3.45 3.45 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . 225.00 189.00 194.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135.00 85.00 85.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 115.00 85.00 83.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220.00 113.50 125.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.00 43.50 45.45 
  ⃰ No Market 
      
Agricultural systems provide multiple benefits for 
society. These benefits are derived from crop and 
animal production, income and livelihood genera-
tion, the natural environment and the cultural lega-
cy of farming communities. Sustained delivery of 
these benefits depends on the clear understanding 
of agricultural processes fostered by cross-
disciplinary collaborations between economists, 
animal scientists, ecologists, community develop-
ment specialists, and agronomists, to mention a 
few. In this context, economic experiments can 
play a key role in enhancing the understanding of 
how people and communities respond to scientific 
innovations and socio-economic policies intended 
to safeguard the integrity of agricultural systems.  
 
Economic experiments are human-subject experi-
ments in which the experimenter systematically 
varies economic incentives facing subjects to eval-
uate how human beings respond to  
 
 scientific innovations such as new varieties of 
seeds,  
 shifts in economic policies such as changes in 
environmental objectives of farmland conser-
vation programs  
 new institutions such as changes in non-point 
source water quality trading schemes 
 new social norms that may impact the socio-
economic landscape of decision making 
 
Experiments shed light on how heterogeneous sets 
of agents respond to new interventions and how 
human  behavior  differs  from  theoretical  bench- 
 marks. There are different types of experiments depend-
ing upon the nature of the subject pool. On one end of 
the spectrum we have controlled and context-free labor-
atory experiments involving student subjects randomly 
recruited from a university’s population. Lab experi-
ments are useful for testing the proof-of concept and 
internal theoretical validity of new interventions before 
they are rolled out in the field with real stakeholders. 
They are low-cost relative to “field experimentation” 
with, for example, farmers (students have much lower 
opportunity costs of experimental participation than 
farmers) and permit the wind-tunnel testing of new poli-
cies just as one would test an aircraft prototype 
(Shogren 2004). On the other end of the spectrum are 
natural experiments where experimental intervention is 
determined by nature, historical events or randomly im-
plemented policy measures. These experiments are 
characterized by zero experimenter control and full real 
life context and enable the study of societal phenome-
non in their most general form. In between, are other 
types of experiments broadly classified as field experi-
ments which vary on the basis of the control and con-
text introduced into the experimental environment often 
known as the testbed (Plott 1997) and the nature of the 
subject pool. The figure provides a representation of 
this classification.  
 
While considering this classification, we note that rather 
than considering one class of economic experiment to 
be more representative and/or more real than another, 
scientific investigation and effective policy making are 
better served by considering that each experiment type 
provides useful guidance for designing the next one. 
For example, lab experiments provide results which can 
inform the effective design of artefactual field experi-
ments involving real stakeholders (i.e. more real life 
context but less experimenter control).  
 
   
Traditionally, economic experiments focused on 
testing theoretical predictions associated with differ-
ent types of market structures such as monopoly.  
Then they came to be used extensively to study stra-
tegic behavior and Nash equilibrium selection in 
different types of games. These were typically con-
text neutral laboratory experiments with applications 
to a wide variety of socio-economic contexts. In re-
lation to agricultural systems, experimentation has 
focused on testing new policies to combat agricul-
tural water pollution (Suter et al. 2010), protect bio-
diversity by reducing habitat fragmentation on pri-
vate farmland ecosystems (Parkhurst and Shogren 
2007, Banerjee et al. 2014), study behavior in rela-
tion to ground water extraction for agriculture (Suter 
et al. 2012) and willingness to adopt new farming 
technologies (Duflo et al. 2011).  
 
Experimentation has also opened up the possibility 
of studying the manner in which various behavioral 
and non-economic factors impact economic decision 
making. For example, experimenters routinely elicit 
subject’s risk attitudes (Holt and Laury 2002) and 
time discount rates (Harrison et al. 2002) to test how 
these features impact behavior. Consideration of non
-economic factors as well as the general agreement 
that the rational agent model may not always apply 
has opened up channels of collaboration between 
economists and psychologists and the growth of the 
new field of behavioral economics For example 
Weng and Carlsson’s (2013) study shows how kin-
ship towards one’s team impacts common property 
resource extraction decisions, Eckel and Wilson’s 
(2007) study shows how community status impacts 
economic behavior  and Alcott’s (2011) study shows 
how social norms impact residential energy use. 
Lab 
Experiment 
Artefactual 
Field 
Experiment 
Framed 
Field 
Experiment 
Randomized  
Control Trials 
Natural 
Experiment 
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There is considerable agreement for the most part that 
agricultural systems worldwide are facing stresses 
caused by both natural and human elements. Effective 
and sustained preservation of these systems requires 
that sound science drive policy. Since natural resources 
are harvested for profit and individual decision making 
is a product of economic and non-economic factors, we 
need to understand how policies directed towards pro-
tecting these systems will affect human behavior. Here, 
economic experimentation can help in identifying direct 
impacts and unintended consequences a priori. These 
outcomes in turn will enable policy makers to design 
policies effectively and target scarce tax dollars in a 
manner that society can get the greatest benefit for the 
least cost.  
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